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Abstract The paper argues that a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of
EPR-type experiments is desirable and possible. It shows how Bohmian mechanics and
the GRW mass density theory offer such an explanation in terms of a non-local
common cause.
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1 Bell’s theorem and the failure of local causality
Bell’s theorem (1964) (reprinted in Bell 2004, ch. 2) proves that any theory that
complies with the experimentally confirmed predictions of quantum mechanics has to
violate a principle of local causality. The idea behind this principle is that, in Bell’s
words, “the direct causes (and effects) of events are near by, and even the indirect
causes (and effects) are no further away than permitted by the velocity of light” (Bell
2004, p. 239). This is one way of formulating the principle of local action that is
implemented in classical field theories and that overcomes Newtonian action at a
distance.
Consider the EPR experiment: two elementary quantum systems are prepared in an
entangled state at the source of the experiment (such as two systems of spin 1/2 in the
singlet state). Later, when they are far apart in space so that there is no interaction any
more between them, Alice chooses the parameter to measure in her wing of the
experiment and obtains an outcome, and Bob does the same in his wing of the
experiment. Alice’s setting of her apparatus is separated by a spacelike interval from
Bob’s setting of his apparatus. Figure 1 illustrates this situation.
In this figure, a stands for Alice’s measurement setting, A for Alice’s outcome, b
stands for Bob’s measurement setting, B for Bob’s outcome, and λ ranges over
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whatever in the past may influence the behaviour of the measured quantum systems
according to the theory under consideration (which may be standard quantum mechan-
ics, or a theory that admits additional, so-called hidden variables) (see Norsen 2009 and
Seevinck and Uffink 2011 for precisions).
Bell’s principle of local causality can then be formulated in the following manner:
Pa;b A B;λjð Þ ¼ Pa A λjð Þ
Pa;b B A;λjð Þ ¼ Pb B λjð Þ
ð1Þ
That is to say: the probabilities for Alice’s outcome depend only on her measurement
setting and λ. Adding Bob’s setting and outcome does not change the probabilities for
Alice’s outcome. The same goes for Bob. Bell’s theorem then proves that quantum
mechanics violates (1). Furthermore, any theory that reproduces the well-confirmed
experimental predictions of quantum mechanics has to violate (1). This conclusion
applies not only to quantum mechanics, but also to quantum field theory (see Bell
2004, ch. 24, and Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés 2013 as well as Lazarovici 2014 for the
current discussion). One can therefore say that Bell’s theorem puts a constraint on
any—present or future—physical theory that is to match the experimentally confirmed
predictions of quantum mechanics.
Note that the proof of Bell’s theorem requires not only the principle of local causality,
but also that the measurement settings a and b are independent of λ. Failure of such
independence can arise in two different ways: either the measurement settings exert some
influence on λ, or λ somehow influences the measurement settings. It is obvious from
Fig. 1 that the first option involves influences travelling backwards in time (see Price
1996, ch. 8 and 9, as well as the papers in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics 38 (2008), pp. 705–784). The second option contradicts the presupposition that
the measurement settings can be freely chosen (see Bell et al. 1985).
Since the presupposition of an independence between themeasurement settings and the
prior state of the measured system is not specific for Bell’s theorem, but applies to any
experimental evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that this theorem establishes a
violation of the principle of local causality (see Maudlin 2011, chs. 1–6, for a detailed
assessment). However, it would be premature to infer from the failure of local causality
that no causal explanation of the correlatedmeasurement outcomes in the EPR experiment
is possible. Suárez (2007) reviews the most influential arguments for this claim and shows
that they are all inconclusive. To be more precise, one cannot expect an explanation of
why nature is non-local (in the sameway as one cannot expect an explanation of why local
Fig. 1 The situation that Bell considers in the proof of his theorem. Figure taken from Seevinck (2010,
appendix) with permission of the author
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causality holds in classical field theories). But the fact that nature is non-local does not
prevent one from searching for a causal explanation of the correlated outcomes of an EPR-
type experiment. This fact only shows that it would be futile to search for an explanation in
terms of causes conforming to the principle of local action.
In the next two sections, we will first ask what kind of causal explanation we should
seek for the correlated outcomes of the EPR experiment (Section 2) and then consider a
general scheme for a causal law (Section 3). Against this background, the heart of the
paper is to argue that we have at least two elaborate proposals at our disposal that offer an
explanation of the EPR correlations in terms of a non-local common cause, namely
Bohmian mechanics (Section 4) and the GRW mass density theory (Section 5).
2 Direct or common cause?
There are two principled ways of causally explaining correlations between two distinct
events: one can either postulate a direct causal influence of one event on the other or
one can suppose that a common cause of the two events accounts for the correlation. In
everyday contexts, this distinction is crucial, because it has consequences for the kinds
of manipulations that we can perform. If there is a direct causal link from event A to
event B, then we can (in principle) bring about changes in B by intervening on A,
whereas this is not possible if A and B are only connected via a common cause. In the
context of quantum mechanics, however, the distinction between a direct cause (DC)
and a common cause (CC) is much more elusive, since we cannot control the outcomes
of quantum measurements in the right way to perform the intervention on A that is
necessary to distinguish between these two causal structures.
Nevertheless, there is a metaphysical interest in separating DC from CC explanations
for the EPR correlations, because these two types of explanation involve very different
kinds of non-locality. (That there has to be some kind of non-locality is a consequence of
Bell’s theorem, as discussed in the previous section.) A CC explanation of the EPR
correlations is committed to some kind of holism or non-separability in the sense that
the common cause, when bringing about the outcome in onewing of the experiment, has to
take into account what happens in the other wing. This holistic character of the common
cause, which somehow spans both wings of the experiment, may seem unfamiliar. By
contrast, the non-locality involved in the DC model seems metaphysically much more
palatable: such a model can be completely separable and no spatially extended causes are
needed; the only unusual aspect is that some causal influences travel faster than light.
However, it is important to note that the DC model only has this advantage as long as the
speed of the supposed causal influence is finite. Consider what van Fraassen points out in
this context:
To speak of instantaneous travel from X to Y is a mixed or incoherent metaphor,
for the entity in question is implied to be simultaneously at X and at Y – in which
case there is no need for travel, for it is at its destination already. … one should
say instead that the entity has two (or more) coexisting parts, that it is spatially
extended. (van Fraassen 1991, p. 351)
Hence, if the speed of the supposed causal influence is infinite, the DC model no
longer displays separability, because the causal influence then is at two places at the
Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2014) 4:181–196 183
same time. We therefore take the finite speed condition to be an essential part of any
DC model. Due to their non-locality, both the DC and the CC model are in tension with
special relativity, by attributing objective reality to some frame dependent notions (the
speed of the causal influence in the DC model, and the commitment to objective
simultaneity in the CC model). Both models are thus implicitly committed to a
preferred foliation of space-time.
One might think that by opting for the DC model, one incurs less ontological costs
than by accepting the holism of the CC model. Nevertheless, there is at present no
serious proposal for explaining the EPR correlations along the lines of the DC model.
Nor does there seem to be any strong motivation for developing such proposals, as
recent research has brought forth a number of empirical and theoretical results which
render the DC model increasingly unattractive:
(a) Large-distance Bell tests put a substantial lower bound on the speed of the causal
influence v postulated by the DC model. For an earth-based reference frame,
Zbinden et al. (2001) found v>2/3 107c, where c denotes the speed of light. More
recent experiments generalize these results to other reference frames, and the
lower bound on v is likely to increase further as better measurement techniques
become available (see Salart et al. 2008 as well as Cocciaro et al. 2011, 2013).
Due to this ongoing experimental research, the finite speed assumption becomes
more and more doubtful.
(b) Some natural ways of implementing the DC model by choosing a suitable
reference frame are even completely ruled out by experimental data. If one
entertains the idea that the preferred reference frame is determined by the exper-
imental set-up, then one has to consider the possibility that the two measuring
devices in an EPR experiment (or at least their relevant parts) are in relative
motion, thus picking out two different reference frames. It then becomes possible
to realize a so-called before-before configuration, in which each of the two
measurements, in the rest frame of the corresponding measuring device, is
considered to happen before the other one. Since this implies that neither of the
two events can influence the other one, the DC model predicts the disappearance
of EPR correlations in such a set-up. Zbinden et al. (2001) and Stefanov et al.
(2002) have empirically falsified this prediction.
(c) As long as only two-particle systems are considered, a DC model can always
reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions by a suitable choice of the pre-
ferred reference frame and a sufficiently high value of v. However, as Bancal et al.
(2012) have shown, this is no longer the case for systems of four entangled
particles. In particular, any DC model then predicts a violation of the so-called
no-signalling conditions.
(d) Part of the attractiveness of the DC model stems from its simplicity: it seems that
one only needs to postulate a causal influence from one measurement event to the
other one. However, Näger (2013) has shown that this is not the case. In order to
violate Bell’s inequalities, a causal model must at least postulate a causal influence
from one of the measurement settings (e.g., the event we denoted by a in
Section 1) to the distant outcome (B), which does not go through the local
outcome (A). This does not rule out all DC models, but it shows that they cannot
be as simple as is usually thought.
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We conclude from these results that a plausible causal explanation of the EPR
correlations is not to be sought along the lines of the DC model. Rather, the explanation
needs to invoke a (non-local) common cause (see Hofer-Szabó et al. 2013, ch. 9, for a
detailed investigation of the conditions under which common cause explanations for
EPR correlations are possible). Before considering concrete proposals in that sense, we
introduce a general conceptual scheme for causal explanations in the next Section.
3 A general scheme for causal explanations
Consider Newtonian mechanics. This theory seeks to explain the temporal develop-
ment of the velocity of particles that are localized at points in physical space. The
theory accounts for change of velocity in terms of forces acting on the particles, and
these forces are traced back to properties of the particles. Thus, in virtue of instantiating
the property of gravitational mass, particles exert a force of attraction upon
each other. If one asks why the particles change their state of motion, the
answer is that they do so because they possess gravitational mass. Gravitational
mass can therefore be conceived as a causal property or a disposition whose effect or
manifestation consists in the force that a particle exerts upon other particles in virtue of
possessing gravitational mass.
Regarding gravitational mass as a dispositional property that figures in a causal
explanation of the mutual attraction of massive particles does not imply the commit-
ment to a particular metaphysics of properties or a particular stance in the metaphysics
of laws of nature. One can notably leave open whether it is essential for the property of
gravitational mass that it exerts the causal role of attracting other particles (dispositional
essentialism—see notably Bird 2007) or whether it is a contingent feature of this
property that it plays this causal role in the actual world (Humeanism—see notably
Lewis 2009). Furthermore, one can leave open whether the property of gravitational
mass grounds Newton’s law of gravitation (or whatever may be the correct law of
gravitation) in the sense that the law supervenes on this property—so that in every
possible world in which the property of gravitational mass is instantiated, Newton’s law
of gravitation holds. In brief, endorsing the mentioned causal explanation requires only
to acknowledge that the property of gravitational mass exerts a certain causal role in the
actual world.
Referring to the property of gravitational mass instantiated by the particles provides
for a causal explanation of the acceleration of the particles independently of whether or
not a medium is indicated by means of which the influence that particles exert on each
other’s state of motion is transmitted and independently of whether or not time passes
between the presence of gravitational mass (the cause) and the acceleration of the
particles (the effect). Thus, Blondeau and Ghins (2012) argue that the “general form of
a causal law is an equation that exhibits the following mathematical form:
E ¼ ∂x=∂t ¼ C1 þ … þ Cn ð2Þ
E refers to the effect, whereas the causes Ci can, but need not, be functions of time.
The above general form reads: C1, C2,… are the causes of the infinitesimal variation of
the property x of a system, i.e. of the effect E” (p. 384). The decisive point is that any law
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fitting into this form is asymmetric in that what appears on the right side induces a
certain temporal development of the quantity on the left side, but not vice
versa, without any time passing between the presence of the causes C1 … Cn
and the effect E, that is, the manner in which x develops in time. Thus, on
Newton’s law of gravitation, the presence of gravitational mass induces a
change in the velocity of the particles without any time passing between the
presence of mass and the acceleration of the particles. Furthermore, for there
being a causal law, providing for causal explanations, it is sufficient to indicate
properties C1 … Cn that have the effect of determining the temporal develop-
ment of the value of the quantity x, but it is not necessary to indicate a
medium through which they do so. These two points—no time passing between
the cause and its effect, no medium of transmission necessary—will be crucial
in developing an explanation of the EPR correlations in terms of a non-local
common cause.
The proposal set out by Blondeau and Ghins (2012) shows that causal explanations
can be given all over physics. If such explanations are cast in terms of (2), there is no
point in claiming that the search for them is rooted in methodological and metaphysical
preconceptions that modern physics has outgrown. In particular, the availability of what
is known as structural explanations by no means makes the search for causal explana-
tions superfluous (as claimed, e.g., by Dorato and Felline 2011). The interest in causal
explanations is to obtain an answer to the question of why a certain variable develops in
a certain manner in time—or, in other words, why a certain event occurs at a certain
place and time. Thus, on the account of Blondeau and Ghins (2012), there even is a
causal explanation of inertial motion, namely in terms of the initial velocity (p. 396) –
although inertial motion is often cited as a prime example of a phenomenon no longer
calling for a causal explanation (see e.g. Dorato and Felline 2011, p. 170). By the same
token, even if one were to accept the claim that quantum mechanics includes a
structural account of EPR-type correlations, the search for a causal explanation of
these correlations would still be well motivated.
Before going into such an explanation, let us briefly consider the other force treated
in classical physics, namely the electromagnetic force. The scheme is the same as in the
case of gravitation: in virtue of instantiating the property of positive or negative charge,
charged particles exert a force of attraction or repulsion upon each other. If one asks
why the particles change their state of motion, the answer is that they do so because
they possess positive or negative charge. Charge can therefore be conceived as a causal
property or a disposition whose effect or manifestation consists in the change of the
state of motion that a particle induces in other particles in virtue of being charged.
By contrast to Newtonian gravitation, the force that a particle exerts upon other
particles in virtue of being charged is retarded, and it is transmitted through a medium,
the electromagnetic field. Thus, charged particles generate a field—the electromagnetic
field—that transmits the electromagnetic force, so that the effect of a charged particle
on the velocity of other charged particles is retarded, the velocity of light being a
constant that constitutes the upper limit velocity for the propagation of that effect. The
classical theory of electromagnetism is therefore generally seen as setting the paradigm
for causal explanations in terms of local action, that is, retarded action transmitted by a
medium. Against this background, Einstein is considered as accomplishing this para-
digm in the special theory of relativity and as developing a theory of gravitation in
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terms of local action in the general theory of relativity, by identifying the gravitational
field with the metrical field of space-time. Nonetheless, even if one endorses this point
of view, it is by no means necessary for a causal explanation to fit into the paradigm of
local action, as the above mentioned general scheme of a causal law and the example of
Newton’s theory of gravitation show. In other words, it is an empirical question whether
or not causal explanations follow the paradigm of local action. Bell’s theorem proves
that they cannot do so in quantum physics.
4 Non-local common cause I: Bohmian mechanics
When turning to quantum physics, one has to be aware of the fact that what the
textbooks provide is a formalism in terms of the temporal development of a wave-
function of quantum systems, which enables the calculation of probabilities for mea-
surement outcomes by means of defining operators or observables and which tells us
how these probabilities develop in time. But the textbooks do not spell out what in the
physical world the wave-function and its temporal development represent. The formal-
ism of a wave-function and its temporal development cannot even take into account the
fact that there are measurement outcomes, unless something is added to that formalism.
If one takes for granted that there are measurement outcomes in physical space, there
then are two principled possibilities to add something to the core textbook formalism of
quantum mechanics: one can either recognize the Schrödinger equation as the law for
the temporal development of the wave-function and provide an additional law that links
the wave-function up with the distribution of matter in space-time and its temporal
development, or one can change the Schrödinger equation so that a law is achieved that
can accommodate the fact of there being measurement outcomes. The paradigmatic
examples are Bohm’s quantum theory for the former approach and the theory of
Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) for the latter approach. We will now show how
each of these theories provides for an explanation of the EPR correlations in terms of a
non-local common cause.
Bohm’s theory proposes an ontology of particles located in physical space and a law
of motion that describes the temporal development of the position of the particles, the
so-called guiding equation. While the actual particle configuration is not taken into
account by the quantum mechanical wave-function (that is why the position of the
particles in Bohm’s theory is often referred to as a hidden variable), the wave-function
and its temporal development according to the Schrödinger equation, if put into the
Bohmian guiding equation and applied to the actual particle configuration, enable to
define a velocity field along which the particles move. Bohm himself presented this
theory as a causal approach to quantum physics (see notably Bohm 1952; Bohm and
Hiley 1993, as well as Holland 1993). He considered his theory as causal, because he
showed that one can understand quantum mechanics within the paradigm that
Newtonian mechanics set for modern physics, namely by adding a further force
that accounts for the situations in which the trajectories of the particles are not
correctly described by classical mechanics. That new force is known as the
quantum potential.
However, the commitment to the quantum potential is widely seen as an ad hoc
move to cast quantum mechanics in the framework of classical mechanics, because the
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quantum potential is quite unlike a classical force. The main objections are the
following three:
(a) Unlike a classical force, the quantum potential does not satisfy Newton’s third
law: there is no reaction from the particles that corresponds to the action of this
force on them.
(b) Unlike the classical forces of gravitation and electromagnetism, the quantum
potential cannot be traced back to a property that each of the particles instantiates
(like mass and charge). It cannot be conceived as a field either, for it does not have
a value at points in space-time. The wave-function, which is supposed to represent
the quantum potential, does not permit to assign values to points of physical
space-time; if it is a field, it can be a field only on configuration space, that is, the
mathematical space each point of which corresponds to a possible configuration
of the particles in physical space. However, it is unintelligible how a force field on
configuration space could move particles in physical space.
(c) Unlike the whole of classical physics, the core of Bohm’s theory does not consist
in a second order equation fulfilling the scheme set by Newton’s second law,
namely to employ forces in order to explain the temporal development of the
velocity of particles. Instead, it is a first order equation, which can be written down
in the following manner:
dQ
dt
¼ μℑ∇Ψ t Qð Þ
Ψ t Qð Þ ð3Þ
In this law, the quantum mechanical wave-function Ψt has the job to determine the
velocity of the particles at a time t, given their position Q at t, with ℑ denoting the
imaginary part and μ being an appropriate dimension factor.
Let us therefore leave the scheme of causal explanations in terms of forces that can
be traced back to properties of particles behind and ask how today’s dominant version
of Bohm’s theory can explain the measurement outcomes of quantum physics. This
version, known as Bohmian mechanics, is committed only to particles localized in
physical space and a law of motion (the guiding equation) in which the wave-function
is employed in order to describe how the positions of the particles develop in time (see
the papers collected in Dürr et al. 2013). The wave-function figuring in Eq. (3) is the
universal wave-function of all the particles in the universe. Since this wave-function is
entangled, the law of motion of Bohmian mechanics is non-local: the velocity of any
particle at a time t depends, via the wave-function, on the position of all the other
particles at t. But this dependency does not mean that there is an interaction among the
particles (which would then be an instantaneous action at a distance). It only means that
the temporal development of any particle is correlated with the temporal development
of all the other particles through the wave-function (although, due to the decoherence of
the universal wave-function, that dependence can in many cases be neglected). Dürr
et al. therefore regard the universal wave-function as nomological, its ontological status
being limited to the role that it performs in the guiding equation (2013, ch. 12). Of
course, simply attributing a nomological status to the wave-function leaves open all the
questions about how laws of nature are grounded in physical reality. But this move
makes it possible to adopt towards the guiding equation and whatever figures in it the
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same attitude as outlined in the preceding section. In short, one can consider the
guiding equation as a causal law.
Let us come back to the general form of a causal law (2). If the ontology is one of
particles and if the law is a first order equation, then its left side is about the temporal
development of the position of the particles (dQ/dt) and its right side indicates the
beables, to use Bell’s terminology, that determine (in a deterministic or a probabilistic
manner) their velocity. That is to say, the quantummechanical wave-function represents
a beable that fixes the velocity of the particles. That beable is also known as the
quantum state. Apart from the difference between a second order and a first order
theory, the only difference from classical mechanics is that this beable is a non-local
one, instead of a local beable instantiated by each particle (such as its mass and its
charge), and that this beable itself develops in time. As mentioned in the quotation from
Blondeau and Ghins (2012) in the preceding section, the general form of a causal law
(2) admits that the factors appearing on the right side also develop in time—as does the
wave-function (unless it should turn out that the universal wave-function is stationary,
as demanded by the Wheeler-DeWitt equation in quantum gravity).
To give a concrete meaning to this notion of a non-local beable in the framework
introduced in Sections 2 and 3, one can despite its non-local character maintain that it is
a causal property, namely a holistic and dispositional property of the configuration of
all the particles, with the manner in which the position of the particles develops in time
being the manifestation of this disposition (see Belot 2012, pp. 77–80, and Esfeld et al.
2013 for a detailed exposition of the view of the wave-function representing a
dispositional property). In the following, we shall take up this conception of the non-
local beable represented by the wave-function being a holistic property of all the
particles in order to provide a concrete meaning to our proposal of a non-local common
cause. But this proposal by no means depends on spelling out that non-local beable in
terms of a (holistic and dispositional) property of the configuration of matter in physical
space. For the argument of this paper, one can also simply leave it at saying that the
wave-function represents a non-local beable. In any case, this non-local beable is
something over and above the local beables consisting in the position of matter in
physical space. In other words, the property of position of the particles does not
determine the holistic property of the particle configuration that is represented by the
wave-function and that fixes the temporal development of the particles.
Hence, in brief, non-locality notwithstanding, Bohmian mechanics offers a causal
explanation of the behaviour of the particles in terms of a non-local beable that can be
conceived as a holistic, causal property instantiated by the particle configuration and
represented by the wave-function. This explanation is less intuitive than an explanation
in terms of forces acting upon the particles. However, the point at issue is to come up
with a conceptually clear and coherent causal explanation, instead of satisfying anthro-
pomorphic intuitions about agent-like entities acting upon each other. The latter ones
have been criticised with good reason by Russell (1912) in his famous denunciation of
the notion of causality. Despite Russell’s criticism, there is a clear notion of a causal
law, a causal property and a causal explanation in physics, but it is simply one in terms
of the variables that determine the temporal development of physical quantities (such as
the position, or the velocity of particles).
Let us now see how this causal explanation works in the case of the EPR experiment.
Bohmian mechanics is a deterministic theory. That is to say, measurement outcomes are
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determined before they occur. What determines the correlated outcomes of an EPR
experiment is the initial particle configuration—that is, the exact initial position of each
of the two particles at the source of the experiment—plus the configuration of particles
that constitute the two measurement apparatuses, which depends on the settings of
parameters in each wing of the experiment. These elements determine the measurement
outcomes via, strictly speaking, the universal wave-function, whereby it is in this case
sufficient to consider the effective wave-function of the particle pair (which depends on
the settings). In other words, the two quantum particles and the particles constituting the
apparatuses in both wings of the experiment instantiate a non-local beable that can be
conceived as a causal property or a disposition, which is represented by the wave-
function and whose effect or manifestation are the correlated measurement outcomes.
The common cause of the measurement outcomes is non-local, because it depends
on the setting of the parameters in both wings of the experiment. More precisely, if one
enquires into the cause of the measurement outcome in one wing and if this outcome
occurs later than the outcome in the other wing on the absolute time parameter that
Bohmian mechanics presupposes, that cause depends on both settings, that is, also the
setting in the other wing. Bohmian mechanics therefore violates the condition known
as parameter independence, as any deterministic theory has to do (see Jarrett 1984;
Shimony 1993, pp. 144–149, and see also Norsen 2009 and Näger 2013 for a critique
of Jarrett’s analysis).
Since this common cause explanation postulates a causal dependence of the outcome
in one wing on the setting in the other wing, one might ask whether it does not allow for
superluminal signalling. In Bohmian mechanics, such signalling is usually taken to be
ruled out by the fact that it is impossible to obtain precise knowledge of the initial
conditions, that is, the exact initial position of each of the two particles at the source of the
experiment. However, given that we are here dealing with a causal dependence between a
controllable factor (the setting) and an observable one (the outcome), it is not immedi-
ately clear why our lack of knowledge about a further factor (the exact initial configu-
ration) should prevent us from exploiting this dependence to send signals. Indeed,
Bohmian mechanics only avoids the possibility of superluminal signalling by relying
on what is known as the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which connects the initial
distribution of the particle positions with the wave-function (seeDürr et al. 2013, ch. 2). If
the equilibrium hypothesis did not hold, one could send a signal by manipulating the
measurement settings in one wing, thereby influencing the effective wave-function of the
two particles, which in turn would influence the outcome in the other wing. But due to
quantum equilibrium, the spatial distribution of the particles is such that the change in the
effective wave-function does not result in a change of the measurement outcome statistics
in the distant wing. Wood and Spekkens (2012, Sec. IV C) take this to be a case of fine-
tuning. If, however, the quantum equilibrium hypothesis can be justified in terms of the
statistical behaviour arising from a typical initial configuration, as Dürr et al. (2013, ch. 2)
argue, there is nothing problematic about this fine-tuning.
Bohmian mechanics is thus not committed to superluminal causation in an opera-
tional sense, but it is so committed in a metaphysical sense: given any initial particle
configuration, the theory supports counterfactual claims of the type: “If Alice had
chosen a different setting, Bob would have obtained a different outcome”. This might
sound like a kind of action at a distance that should be understood in terms of a DC
model (see Section 2), rather than as the manifestation of a common cause. We
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nevertheless consider the CC point of view more appropriate, for two reasons: First, as
argued in Section 2, the DC model includes a commitment to the finite speed of the
causal influence, in contrast to the Bohmian explanation developed here. Second, it is
not correct to say that there is a direct causal influence from Alice’s setting to Bob’s
outcome. Alice’s setting influences Bob’s outcome only via a further causal factor
(which in turn influences both outcomes), namely the non-local beable (or holistic
property) represented by the effective wave-function of the two particles. This factor,
together with the (spatial) particle configuration, constitutes the common cause of the
measurement outcomes.
Since the common cause in this explanation depends on the settings of the mea-
surement parameters, it is obvious that it cannot be identified with the variable λ in
Fig. 1, which is independent of the measurement settings. Rather, λ here includes only
the initial quantum state (represented by the initial wave-function) and the initial
configuration of the two particles, whereas the common cause is a later (quantum plus
configuration) state of the two particles, which depends on the previously chosen
measurement settings. Our explanation therefore violates what San Pedro (2012) calls
“measurement independence”, but is often (rather misleadingly, as he argues) called
“no-conspiracy condition”. We agree with San Pedro that this violation does not imply
any kind of conspiracy, and our explanation has a similar structure to the common
cause model he proposes. We disagree, however, about the sharp contrast he draws
between his model and Bohmian mechanics, based on the claim that the latter, unlike
the former, satisfies measurement independence (p. 154). This claim seems to rest on
the (mistaken) identification of the common cause with the variable λ. Our analysis
shows that if one correctly identifies the common cause, Bohmian mechanics violates
measurement independence just as San Pedro’s causal model does.
The difference between λ and the common cause in the explanation given above is
also important if one tries to connect our discussion with some other statistical
conditions familiar from the literature on Bell’s theorem. For example, if one were to
replace λ in Bell’s locality condition (1) by the common cause variable, the determin-
istic character of our model would straightforwardly imply the fulfillment of this
condition (both sides of each equation becoming either 0 or 1). By the same token,
our above statement that Bohmian mechanics violates parameter independence would
then become false. However, this should not mislead anyone into calling our causal
model “local”: the appearance of locality simply arises because the (non-local) depen-
dence on the measurement settings has been absorbed into the common cause variable.
To reiterate this point, using the terminology of Hofer-Szabó et al. (2013, ch. 9): the fact
that our model satisfies “hidden locality” has no metaphysical significance, since it
simultaneously violates “weak no-conspiracy”. Finally, let us note in this context that
we share the widely held intuition that a common cause should function as a screener-
off for the correlation it is supposed to explain. The common cause in our explanation
does this, again, by virtue of its deterministic character.
If the EPR experiment is done with two particles of spin 1/2 in the singlet state—so
that the measurement outcomes consist in correlated values of spin in certain
directions-, nothing in this explanation changes. According to Bohmian mechanics,
spin is not a local beable over and above position, but a manner in which particles
behave in certain experimental contexts (see Bell 2004, ch. 4, and Norsen 2013). The
only local property that the particles have is their position, and all measurement
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outcomes consist in a physical entity having a certain position in space at a certain time.
Thus, the correlated outcomes of an EPR experiment on two particles of spin 1/2 in the
singlet state are in Bohmian mechanics also accounted for by the mentioned common
cause, namely a non-local beable (a holistic property) instantiated by the two quantum
particles and the particles constituting the two measurement apparatuses, which deter-
mines the measurement outcomes in determining how the particles move.
5 Non-local common cause II: the GRW mass density theory
Let us now turn to the other type of approach to conceive the quantum formalism as
representing the distribution of matter in physical space, namely to change the
Schrödinger equation so that a law is achieved that can accommodate the fact of there
being measurement outcomes in physical space, as exemplified by the formalism
proposed by Ghirardi et al. (1986) (GRW). An equation that is able to describe
measurement outcomes does of course in itself not reveal how the distribution of
matter in physical space constitutes measurement outcomes. In other words, it does
not tell us what the matter in space and time is, which is represented by the GRW
formalism. Ghirardi answers this question by proposing an ontology of a continuous
distribution of matter in space—a mass density field—that develops in time according
to the GRW law (see Ghirardi et al. 1995, and see Monton 2004 for a philosophical
discussion). More precisely, the wave-function in configuration space and its temporal
development according to the GRWequation represent at any time the density of matter
(mass) in physical space. The spontaneous localization of the wave-function in config-
uration space represents a spontaneous contraction of the mass density in physical
space, thus accounting for measurement outcomes and well localized macroscopic
objects in general. Instead of particles, there hence is a field of density of stuff
(gunk), with there being more stuff at some points and regions of space than at others.
Given that there is just one universal wave-function, there is just one matter density
field in the whole of space. As in Bohmian mechanics, one can take the universal wave-
function as it figures in the GRW law to represent a non-local beable over and above
the local beables that consist in the density of stuff at points of space. Again, one can
spell out this notion of a non-local beable in terms of a causal property or a disposition
that determines the temporal development of the matter density field in physical space,
the manner in which the matter density develops in time being the effect of that causal
property or the manifestation of that disposition. Since the GRW law is probabilistic
instead of deterministic, that disposition is a propensity grounding objective probabil-
ities for a certain temporal development of the density of matter in the whole of space
(see Dorato and Esfeld 2010 for dispositions and propensities in GRW quantum
mechanics). In any case, again, there is a non-local common cause of the temporal
development of the density of matter in the whole of space.
The main ontological difference between Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass
density theory is not that the law of motion of the latter is probabilistic, whereas the law
of the former is deterministic, but that according to the latter theory, physical entities do
not always move continuously through space. Consider, for the sake of illustration,
Einstein’s thought experiment with one particle in a box: the box is split in two halves
which are sent in opposite directions, say from Brussels to New York and Tokyo. When
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the half-box arriving in New York is opened and found to be empty, all accounts of
quantum mechanics that recognize the uniqueness of measurement outcomes agree that
the particle is in the half-box in Tokyo (see Norsen 2005 for details of this thought
experiment). On Bohmian mechanics, the particle always travels in one of the two half-
boxes, depending on its initial position, and the cause of its motion is local in this case,
given by the effective wave-function of the particle. On the GRW mass density theory,
the particle is in fact a field that stretches over the whole box and that is split in two
halves of equal density when the box is split, these masses travelling in opposite
directions. Upon interaction with a measurement device, one of these masses (the
one in New York in the example given above) disappears, while the mass density in
the other half-box (the one in Tokyo) increases so that the whole mass is concentrated
in one of the half-boxes. The difference between Bohmian mechanics and the GRW
mass density theory thus is the following one: on the latter theory, non-local causation
means that a physical entity disappears in one place and appears in another; on the
former theory, non-local causation means that a causal property, which is non-local in
that it is instantiated by a configuration of particles as a whole, determines the velocity
of each particle, while particles always move through space on continuous trajectories.
One might be tempted to describe what happens according to the GRWmass density
theory in the above example by saying that some matter travels from New York to
Tokyo when one of the half-boxes is opened, but the considerations of Section 2 speak
against assigning any finite speed to this travel. Consequently (recall van Fraassen’s
remark about “instantaneous travel” quoted in Section 2), use of the “travel” metaphor
is inappropriate. For lack of a better term, let us say that some matter is delocated from
New York to Tokyo. Nevertheless, what is known as the collapse of the wave-function
does not have to be instantaneous, but can be a continuous process in the sense that the
temporal development of the wave-function does not display any “jumps”. The most
important proposal in this respect is the continuous spontaneous localization model
(see Ghirardi et al. 1990). However, this model does not postulate a finite speed of the
causal influence either; the time it takes for the matter density to disappear in one place
and to appear in another place does not depend on the distance between the two places.
Therefore, there is no travel of matter upon wave-function collapse on this model either.
It hence does not face the objections listed in Section 2. Another advantage of the
continuous spontaneous localization model is that the wave-function can, as in theories
without collapse, be described by a differential equation conforming to the general
scheme (2). This makes it possible to conceive the temporal development of the mass
density as a causal process in the sense of Blondeau and Ghins (2012).
Let us now turn to the explanation that the GRW mass density theory gives of the
EPR experiment. Recall that as in Bohmian mechanics, there is no local beable of spin
in this theory: the only local physical property (local beable) is the density of mass at
any given point of space. Thus, the outcomes of what is regarded as measurements of
spin have to be accounted for in terms of the temporal development of the mass density.
Furthermore, since the GRW equation is probabilistic instead of deterministic, a
measurement outcome is not fixed by anything before the wave-function has actually
undergone a spontaneous localization in configuration space.
The interaction of the two-“particle” matter field with both the apparatuses triggers
an irreducibly stochastic process (the “collapse”) changing the shape of the mass
density, which then causes the two measurement outcomes. Once again, the common
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cause is non-local, as it depends on the interaction of the matter field with both of the
measurement devices and the non-local beable that is represented by the wave-function.
Hence, although the GRW theory violates the condition known as outcome indepen-
dence (and not, like Bohmian mechanics, the condition known as parameter indepen-
dence, as explained in the previous section), this does not mean that one of the
outcomes causes the other one. Instead, there is a common cause given by the mass
density of the two-“particle” system, namely its delocation as represented by the
spontaneous localization of the wave-function in configuration space (the “collapse”).
Although the GRW theory is a paradigm case of an indeterministic theory, it is
important to note that the common cause in the explanation just given acts determin-
istically: once the “collapse” occurs, the propensity for spontaneous localization having
been triggered, the shape of the matter field completely determines the measurement
outcomes. If, alternatively, one were to identify the state of the system before the
spontaneous localization of the wave-function as a (probabilistic) cause of the out-
comes, it would not be legitimate to refer to it as a common cause, because the pre-
collapse state in general fails to screen off the EPR correlations. Therefore, it is the
delocation of the mass density in “collapse” that acts as a (deterministic, non-local)
common cause of the measurement outcomes according to the GRW mass density
theory.
As in the case of Bohmian mechanics, the non-locality involved in this theory does
not allow for the sending of superluminal signals. But unlike Bohmian mechanics, the
GRWmass density theory does not need to invoke fine-tuning to explain why this is so.
The reason is that the GRW theory does not postulate additional variables (such as
Bohmian particle positions) that then need to be coordinated with the statistical role of
the wave-function via an additional postulate (i.e., the quantum equilibrium hypothe-
sis). The mass density is completely specified by the wave-function, and the impossi-
bility of superluminal signalling is accounted for by the fact that the pre-collapse state
of the mass density cannot be observed, since any intervention by means of a
macroscopic device brings about an irreducibly stochastic change of the mass density
distribution.
Let us briefly mention the fact that there is another ontology of the GRW formalism
available, which gives up the idea of a continuous distribution of matter in space and of
a physical entity being delocated across space. According to the ontology that Bell
(2004, ch. 22) proposed for the GRW formalism, whenever there is a spontaneous
localization of the wave-function in configuration space, that development of the wave-
function in configuration space represents an event occurring in physical space, namely
there being a flash centred around a space-time point (the term “flash”, however, is not
Bell’s, but was introduced by Tumulka 2006). The flashes are all there is in space-time.
That is to say, apart from when it spontaneously localizes, the temporal development of
the wave-function in configuration space does not represent the distribution of matter in
physical space. It represents the objective probabilities for the occurrence of further
flashes, given an initial configuration of flashes and an initial wave-function. Hence, in
contrast to Bohmian mechanics and the GRW mass density ontology, the GRW flash
ontology does not admit a continuous distribution of matter: there are only flashes
being sparsely distributed in space-time, but no trajectories (worldlines) or fields
(densities) of anything in physical space. Nonetheless, one may seek a causal expla-
nation of the correlated outcomes of the EPR experiment also in the framework of the
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GRW flash ontology. In this case, however, one would have to conceive the non-local
common cause as stretching back into the past, including notably the flashes at the
source of the experiment.
In conclusion, calling for a causal explanation of experimental results is a well-taken
demand also in the case of the correlated outcomes of EPR-type experiments, and that
demand can be satisfied. In particular, the two main versions of quantum physics that
recognize the existence of measurement outcomes—Bohmian mechanics and the GRW
mass density theory—each offer an explanation of the results of EPR-type experiments
in terms of a non-local common cause.
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